Philosophy of Mind

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The study of consciousness and mental processes.

Dualism: The belief that there are two different substances in the universe - physical and non-physical - and that the mind or soul is non-physical.
Materialism: The belief that everything, including the mind, can be explained in terms of physical matter and natural phenomena alone.
Functionalism: The belief that mental states can be explained by their functional role or contribution to the system as a whole, rather than by their physical or chemical composition.
Identity Theory: The belief that mental states are identical to physical states in the brain - that there is a one-to-one correspondence between mental and physical entities.
Phenomenology: The study of subjective experience - what it is like to be in a particular mental state or have a certain type of conscious awareness.
Qualia: The subjective qualities or properties of mental states or sensory experiences, such as the taste of strawberry or the color red.
Consciousness: The state of being aware of and able to think and perceive one's surroundings, as well as one's own internal mental states.
Intentionality: The ability of mental states to be directed at or about something, such as an object, idea, or other mental state.
Free Will: The belief that humans have the ability to make choices that are not determined solely by their past experiences or the laws of physics.
Cognition: The mental processes and activities involved in acquiring, processing, and using knowledge and information.
Language: The system of communication using symbols, such as words and gestures, that allows humans to convey and share information.
Artificial Intelligence: The attempt to create machines that can perform tasks that typically require human cognitive abilities, such as learning, problem-solving, and decision-making.
Quote: "Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the ontology and nature of the mind and its relationship with the body."
Quote: "The mind–body problem is a paradigmatic issue in philosophy of mind."
Quote: "Hard problem of consciousness and the nature of particular mental states."
Quote: "Mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness and its neural correlates, the ontology of the mind, the nature of cognition and of thought, and the relationship of the mind to the body."
Quote: "Dualism and monism are the two central schools of thought on the mind–body problem."
Quote: "Dualism finds its entry into Western philosophy thanks to René Descartes in the 17th century."
Quote: "Substance dualists like Descartes argue that the mind is an independently existing substance."
Quote: "Property dualists maintain that the mind is a group of independent properties that emerge from and cannot be reduced to the brain, but that it is not a distinct substance."
Quote: "This view was espoused by the 17th-century rationalist Baruch Spinoza."
Quote: "Physicalists argue that only entities postulated by physical theory exist."
Quote: "Idealists maintain that the mind is all that exists and that the external world is either mental itself, or an illusion created by the mind."
Quote: "Neutral monists such as Ernst Mach and William James argue that events in the world can be thought of as either mental (psychological) or physical depending on the network of relationships into which they enter."
Quote: "Behaviorism, the type identity theory, anomalous monism, and functionalism."
Quote: "Modern philosophers of mind adopt either a reductive physicalist or non-reductive physicalist position."
Quote: "Reductive physicalists assert that all mental states and properties will eventually be explained by scientific accounts of physiological processes and states."
Quote: "Non-reductive physicalists argue that although the mind is not a separate substance, mental properties supervene on physical properties."
Quote: "Continued neuroscientific progress has helped to clarify some of these issues."
Quote: "First, it is irreconcilable with self-identity over time. Secondly, intentional states of consciousness do not make sense on non-reductive physicalism. Thirdly, free will is impossible to reconcile with either reductive or non-reductive physicalism. Fourthly, it fails to properly explain the phenomenon of mental causation."
Quote: "Modern philosophers of mind continue to ask how the subjective qualities and the intentionality of mental states and properties can be explained in naturalistic terms."
Quote: "These approaches have been particularly influential in the sciences, especially in the fields of sociobiology, computer science (specifically, artificial intelligence), evolutionary psychology, and the various neurosciences."