Philosophy of mind

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The study of consciousness, perception, and mental states.

Mind-body dualism: This topic explores the relationship between the physical and the mental aspects of human beings. Dualists believe that the mind and the body are two separate entities that interact with one another.
Materialism: This topic argues that the mind is not a separate entity but rather an emergent property of the brain. Materialists believe that mental states are nothing but physical states of the brain.
Functionalism: This topic argues that mental states are not dependent on the physical states of the brain but rather on the functions that those states serve. Functionalists believe that mental states can be simulated by any system that performs the same functions.
Behaviorism: This topic focuses on observable behaviors rather than unobservable mental processes. Behaviorists believe that mental states are nothing but dispositions to behave in certain ways.
Intentionality: This topic explores the relationship between mental states and their objects. Intentional states have an aboutness that allows mental states to be directed towards specific objects or concepts.
Consciousness: This topic explores the nature of subjective experience. Consciousness is the experience of being aware of one's surroundings, thoughts, and emotions.
Qualia: This topic explores the subjective qualities of conscious experience. Qualia are the phenomenal qualities that accompany certain conscious experiences such as the redness of red or the taste of chocolate.
Phenomenology: This topic explores the structure and content of conscious experience. Phenomenology seeks to describe the subjective experience of consciousness in a precise and systematic way.
Thought experiments: This topic uses hypothetical scenarios to explore philosophical concepts. Thought experiments are often used in philosophy of mind to explore different theories and arguments.
Artificial intelligence: This topic explores the possibility of creating machines that can perform cognitive tasks traditionally associated with human beings. AI research often raises philosophical questions about the nature of consciousness, intentionality, and mental states.
Behaviorism: A philosophical position that holds that mental states are best understood as behavioral dispositions or tendencies to behave in a certain way.
Functionalism: A philosophical position that holds that mental states are best understood as abstract functional states of a system, rather than as concrete physical states of a brain.
Identity Theory: A philosophical position that holds that mental states are identical to physical brain states.
Eliminative Materialism: A philosophical position that holds that mental states do not exist, and that our current beliefs about the mind are fundamentally mistaken.
Dualism: A philosophical position that holds that mental states and physical brain states are two distinct and separate types of entities.
Idealism: A philosophical position that holds that the mind and mental states are the only things that truly exist, and that the physical world is illusory.
Phenomenalism: A philosophical position that holds that only conscious experiences or perceptions exist, and that physical objects and properties are just collections of these experiences.
Panpsychism: A philosophical position that holds that some level of consciousness exists in all physical matter, from atoms to humans.
Embodied Cognition: A philosophical position that holds that cognition is not just a function of the brain, but rather emerges from the interaction between the brain, body, and environment.
Extended Mind: A philosophical position that holds that mental states and cognitive processes extend beyond the individual brain and into the environment, including physical objects and other people.
Quote: "Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the ontology and nature of the mind and its relationship with the body."
Quote: "The mind–body problem is a paradigmatic issue in philosophy of mind."
Quote: "Hard problem of consciousness and the nature of particular mental states."
Quote: "Mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness and its neural correlates, the ontology of the mind, the nature of cognition and of thought, and the relationship of the mind to the body."
Quote: "Dualism and monism are the two central schools of thought on the mind–body problem."
Quote: "Dualism finds its entry into Western philosophy thanks to René Descartes in the 17th century."
Quote: "Substance dualists like Descartes argue that the mind is an independently existing substance."
Quote: "Property dualists maintain that the mind is a group of independent properties that emerge from and cannot be reduced to the brain, but that it is not a distinct substance."
Quote: "This view was espoused by the 17th-century rationalist Baruch Spinoza."
Quote: "Physicalists argue that only entities postulated by physical theory exist."
Quote: "Idealists maintain that the mind is all that exists and that the external world is either mental itself, or an illusion created by the mind."
Quote: "Neutral monists such as Ernst Mach and William James argue that events in the world can be thought of as either mental (psychological) or physical depending on the network of relationships into which they enter."
Quote: "Behaviorism, the type identity theory, anomalous monism, and functionalism."
Quote: "Modern philosophers of mind adopt either a reductive physicalist or non-reductive physicalist position."
Quote: "Reductive physicalists assert that all mental states and properties will eventually be explained by scientific accounts of physiological processes and states."
Quote: "Non-reductive physicalists argue that although the mind is not a separate substance, mental properties supervene on physical properties."
Quote: "Continued neuroscientific progress has helped to clarify some of these issues."
Quote: "First, it is irreconcilable with self-identity over time. Secondly, intentional states of consciousness do not make sense on non-reductive physicalism. Thirdly, free will is impossible to reconcile with either reductive or non-reductive physicalism. Fourthly, it fails to properly explain the phenomenon of mental causation."
Quote: "Modern philosophers of mind continue to ask how the subjective qualities and the intentionality of mental states and properties can be explained in naturalistic terms."
Quote: "These approaches have been particularly influential in the sciences, especially in the fields of sociobiology, computer science (specifically, artificial intelligence), evolutionary psychology, and the various neurosciences."