Coordination games

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Games in which players must coordinate their actions in order to achieve a desirable outcome. Examples of coordination games include the Battle of the Sexes and the Stag Hunt.

Non-cooperative game theory: This topic deals with games where players make their decisions independently, without any cooperation or communication. It includes subtopics such as dominant strategy, Nash equilibrium, Pareto efficiency, and the prisoner's dilemma.
Cooperative game theory: This topic deals with games where players can cooperate and make binding agreements. It includes subtopics such as the Shapley value, the core, and the Nash bargaining solution.
Repeated games: This topic deals with games that are played multiple times, allowing players to learn from each other's behavior and adjust their strategies accordingly.
Evolutionary game theory: This topic deals with the evolution of strategies and behaviors in populations of players over time, and how this can lead to the emergence of stable equilibria.
Coordination games: This topic specifically deals with games where players benefit from coordinating their actions or choosing the same strategy. Examples include the battle of the sexes and the stag hunt.
Mixed strategies: This topic deals with games where players can randomize their decisions according to a probability distribution.
Game-tree search: This topic deals with the computational methods used to solve games, particularly in the context of artificial intelligence and game-playing agents.
Bayesian games: This topic deals with games where players have private information or uncertainty about each other's payoffs or strategies.
Social network analysis: This topic deals with the impact of social networks on game play, and how network structure affects coordination and cooperation.
Experimental game theory: This topic deals with the empirical study of game play, with a focus on how players behave in different types of games and how they learn over time.
Stag Hunt: In this game, players can choose to hunt a stag or a hare. Both players must choose stag to maximize their payoff, but if one player chooses hare, the other player is better off choosing hare as well.
Chicken: In this game, two players are driving towards each other and must decide whether to stay the course or swerve. Players receive high payoff by swerving while the other player stays on course. If both players swerve, lower payoffs are received.
Battle of the Sexes: In this game, two players must agree on where to go for the evening but have different preferences. Players receive the highest payoff when both agree to go to the same location but receive higher payoffs if they go to different locations than no agreement at all.
Volunteer's Dilemma: In this game, a group of players must decide whether or not to participate in a collective action. While there are group benefits to participating, the individual cost may outweigh the benefit.
Assurance: In this game, two players must agree to work together to achieve a common goal. Each player may choose to work diligently or slack off, but if one player slacks off, the other must as well to prevent a negative outcome.
Common-pool Resource: In this game, players must decide how much to take from a shared resource. While taking more provides individual gain, taking less benefits everyone in the long run.
Public Goods: In this game, players must decide whether to contribute to a public good or keep their resources to themselves. While contributing benefits the group, not contributing provides the highest individual gain.
Coordination with Imperfect Information: Players must make a decision with incomplete knowledge of their opponents' preferences, such as in the game of "Matching Pennies.".
Leadership Coordination: Players must defer to a "leader" who can coordinate their actions effectively.
Multiple Equilibria: In games with more than one Nash equilibrium, players must choose which equilibrium to pursue. The best outcome usually depends on what other players are doing.